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AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
This interview originally appeared in a 1984 symposium issue of the
New York University Review of Law & Social Change entitled "The Impact
of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision-Making."' The issue
published nine of the papers that had been given at a conference held on
this topic at Rutgers Law School in the spring of 1983. The purpose of the
conference, which involved participants from a range of disciplines, was
"to examine critically the impact of the theoretical positions and proposals
advanced by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit on cases involving state
intervention in parent-child relationships." 2 I was an editor of the issue and,
although my father was not a participant in the conference, he agreed to be
interviewed by me for the Review.
Like so much else that has happened in my life, the interview took
place in our large, sunny living room in Woodbridge. As I recall, my father
sat on the small couch beneath the window, and I sat in a nearby chair with
a tape recorder, trying to be appropriately dispassionate and professional.
What was my role here, what were the limits of my role? I see now that
these questions could form the basis for a chapter in certain kinds of books.
But at the time, my role seemed relatively straightforward.
I was here to interview Joseph Goldstein, the author of some very
controversial ideas about child custody and placement. I was a law student
working on a law journal and he was a law professor. As far as I knew then
and know now, there are no other published interviews with him. In print,
he is represented by carefully crafted, polished prose. Although I do not
know if he ever had occasion to refuse an interview, the fact that I was his
daughter may have helped persuade him to grant this particular request.
As I look at the interview now, I see that the questions I asked were not
only direct but sometimes confrontational. I recall that at the time, I felt
there was a lot to be challenged and that I wanted to pose the most difficult,
provocative questions I could. Perhaps the biggest advantage I had in my
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role as daughter-interviewer was that I felt no trepidation or reluctance to
ask questions that spared the niceties and went right to what I saw as the
most troubling issues raised by critics.
My father was a man whose feelings showed in the set of his mouth, the
expression in his eyes. During the interview, he was serious, professional,
at times critical, but he did not hide his evident pleasure in being
interviewed and even challenged by his daughter. Though this did not make
my job as interviewer any easier, I did not expect nor would I have wanted
it to be otherwise.
Anne Goldstein
January 2001
THE REVIEW: How do you respond to the criticism that in practice your
theories serve to encourage childcare workers to prolong temporary
placements so that stronger ties are formed with a foster family whom the
worker perceives as "better" than the child's natural family, and that this
eventually facilitates a permanent placement with the foster family?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: If this is the effect, it is certainly contrary to
everything we propose. First of all, we say that it is an obligation of state
agencies to make every possible effort to maintain children in their own
family setting. Second, we urge that every effort be made to maintain the
continuity of ties with the family from whom the child has been removed. It
is-or at least it should be-a function of foster parents to keep alive these
ties and bonds, because the primary goal of temporary placement is to
restore a child as quickly as possible to the family from which she came.
If foster care were really temporary and used as preparation for early
return, many of the problems associated with it would not exist. But if the
reality is that foster care is not temporary in the eyes of a particular child
because of the passage of time, depending upon the age of the child and the
extent to which the agency maintains the ties, the least detrimental
alternative may be for that child to remain with the foster family. A
contradictory problem in the system is that children are moved from one
foster caretaker to another, in part to protect the opportunity to return the
child to her biological family. Each time the child is moved, depending on
her age, there is damage done to her capacity to establish meaningful
relationships, to feel secure about herself.
At some point, yes, it is true, there are going to be hurt parents and
disappointed parents who don't have their children returned to them. But if
the societal choice is between hurting one set of parents over another and
doing as little harm as possible to the child, we, as citizens, not as childcare
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experts, prefer a policy that safeguards the child's well-being. No matter
what decision is made, there is likely to be in these situations one set of
disappointed parents and one set of pleased parents. The purpose of
affirmative action here is to serve the interests of the child, not those of the
competing adults.
THE REVIEW: How does a child know that a placement is temporary?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: Now that is a very important issue. It goes
directly to the meaning of continuity and a child's sense of time. Much
depends, of course, on the age of the child. An infant is not going to know a
placement is temporary at all. A toddler, a school-age child may be helped
to understand that it is temporary. Older children can expect and hope that it
will be temporary if they have had a long and continuing relationship with
their parents. It is precisely because the younger child may not be able to
understand, that ties develop without regard to any prior relationship. The
less extensive the prior relationship, the more difficult it is to establish
temporariness for the child.
For example, consider a child of three years who has been living with
her parents. Because of an emergency, the child is removed from her home.
At the time the child is removed, possibly at the request of her parents,
there is every expectation that things can be righted in the next six or ten or
twelve months. What does a worker do to maintain the prior ties?
First of all, the child ought to be placed as close to wherever the parents
reside as possible, so that it is convenient for the parents to see the child
frequently. The foster parent must encourage the family to retain as much
contact as possible. In addition, foster parents should understand, for
example, that it is important to work very hard to keep a school-age child in
the same school district, the same neighborhood, to reduce the extent of the
break between that child and her classmates and neighbors.
Maintaining the prior ties means little things that one can only hint at,
because interpersonal relationships as they develop are so complex. It may
be that the rattle or the toys in the crib or the crib itself are moved from the
home to the foster home to minimize the strangeness of the new setting. If
the natural parent sings certain songs to the child at night before she goes to
bed, or whatever, the foster parent should try to do likewise. The foster
family should continue to rear the child as closely as possible in the ways of
the original family. This may well mean that in selecting the foster parent,
care should be taken to seek people with a similar outlook and background,
to reduce the extent of change and make the transfer to and back as easy as
possible. That does not mean that in the eyes of the child it is easy; it will
be very difficult, but at the very least there should be a conscious
recognition of the difficulty and an attempt to make it easier.
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One of the things that was done with the children who were removed
from wartime London and placed in a residential nursery with Anna Freud
and other workers was always to make sure that the child's hairstyle did not
change. When the mother or father visited, there was a kind of instant
recognition. At the same time the parents who had to remain in London
while the children were evacuated were encouraged not to change their hair.
A comparable situation arises when a child is placed in a hospital. In
the old days, hospitals would not allow parents to stay with young children
because the nurses and doctors did not want that burden, that kind of
intrusion. It was a terribly painful experience for children who missed their
parents. Now we recognize that it is desirable in most cases to allow
patients free access to their children in the hospital so that ties can be
maintained.
THE REVIEW: How do parents, childcare workers, and judges know
when short-term care has become long-term care?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: In the first book we intentionally avoided
setting any specific periods of time. We thought it would be much better to
try to work out on a case-by-case basis what would be a permissible
separation in terms of each individual child. But it is unfortunately true that
a large percentage of the workers in the field are ill-equipped to do the job
and have much more work than they can do sensibly. In the second book
we set out guidelines because we recognized that more harm would be done
by a free exercise of discretion than by providing some guidance in relation
to the ages of the children involved.
The guidelines err on the side of time periods that, from the child's
vantage point, are really far longer than would be necessary to break an old
tie or establish a new one. We did this in order to be as protective as
possible of those parents who may have lost their child. We were being
overcautious out of concern for those people who are disadvantaged by the
administration of law in every area. We also compromised somewhat our
own personal preference for erring on the side of the child's best interests
because we recognize how inexact are the means for measuring the
significance of time for the child. More than that, with regard to older
children, we included a provision which is intended to allow for exceptions
to the fixed periods where there is a substantial possibility that there are still
strong ties between the older child and the prior caretaker that ought to be
taken into account when choosing the least detrimental alternative.
THE REvIEw: What happens when care that all parties intend to be
short-term becomes long-term?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: It is true that there will always be some
children who are left for a period of time in a setting that makes it very
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difficult or impossible to return them to the setting from which they came
without doing them more harm than good. That is unfortunately the nature
of all human and societal institutions. There are unanticipated events and
unintended consequences. The question then becomes a societal one:
Should the burden of the unintended delay fall on the parents, who are
deeply hurt, or fall on the child, who is growing and developing in a setting
that in her eyes has become home?
There is absolutely no reason why society can't say that it should be the
legal parent's interests that should be paramount. If this were the guiding
goal, the child would be returned under almost any circumstances. Then
you would use another set of guidelines giving those parents whatever they
want because they are in law the parent. But if you accept the notion that
the child's interests are to prevail once the child has become the subject of a
decision by the state, then you have to take into account what is happening
to that child, whether it is the parent's fault or not. This is what people get
stuck on; it is not a question of fault.
THE REVIEW: From your point of view, is it possible that society could
decide that we are now in a time of crisis, that disadvantaged people are
losing their children and that society must stop that even if it means
breaking newer and stronger ties-a decision similar to one that was made
in the Netherlands after World War II to return Jewish children to their
original families?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: Society could certainly say that there is
something more important than the well-being of a particular child, such as
protecting the rights of poor adult women or minorities. Whether or not that
is a policy I would support is another question, but if society adopts that
policy then it seems to me it ought to adopt it recognizing that it can't
operate that policy and then say, this is for the child's best interests.
THE REVIEW: How do you respond to people who say that the blood tie
is the most important factor to take into consideration, that in the long run,
whatever the short-term disruption, it is better for the child to be with its
natural parents?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: One of the things we are very confident about
is that for a variety of reasons most people cannot make long-term
predictions about children. In order to avoid a massive error, which is
possible under the social policy you are suggesting because the state is such
a gross instrument, we must make determinations based on what we know
and what short-term predictions might justify. And the short-term
prediction for many children who have been in long-term foster care with
the same family is an enormous disruption in development. People who talk
about biological ties have latched onto something as a shorthand without
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understanding what underlies its development, using it in a mechanical way
without regard to the interests of the child.
Early common-law cases, though they recognize the notion of the blood
tie, came to accept its significance because of the function that was attached
to it, that is, an expectation that those with inherent biological connections
would be the source of affection and nourishment and care on a continuing
basis. The preference was at first a paternal one, because the father was
perceived as the person who could provide the wherewithal and care for the
helpless child. The presumption in favor of the blood tie could be
overcome, however, by establishing that adults who were permanent
parents were not necessarily the adults who actually served as legal parents.
Some of the most interesting early cases articulate the continuity
principle and the need for affectionate care and, in terms of the justification
for overcoming the presumption in favor of the blood tie, functionally
recognize the modem doctrine of the primary caregiver. Identifying the
primary caregiver in functional terms means, for example, that when the
dispute is between a husband and wife, the mother should not necessarily
be preferred over the father as caregiver. In eliminating the maternal
preference, both mother and father start out with equal status. If there is a
dispute, it is the task of the court to identify who is actually the source of
care for the child on a continuing basis.
The blood tie has become a shorthand, detached over time from its
underlying function. It is a nice illustration of how a guideline developed as
common law can come to be misapplied when the underlying reason for it
gets lost. Courts mechanically applied the blood tie notion without taking
into account, except when the presumption was overcome in rare cases, that
the reason for it was that that natural parent was expected to be the primary
source of care on a continuing basis.
THE REVIEW: If what is best or least detrimental for a child will always
be a matter of controversy, wouldn't it make more sense to make decisions
in a rights-based framework? Shouldn't we say that natural parents have
constitutionally protected rights that can be infringed only under the most
extreme circumstances, even after the child is out of the home?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: No, I don't think so. The critical word in the
question is natural. If you said "parents" as opposed to "natural parents,"
then the constitutional right would really be a right of the child to
autonomous parents and I would agree with that. Though the presumption
would be in favor of the biological parents at the start, that presumption
could be overcome. One of the critical questions in law ought to be, who
are the child's parents? It is a mechanical notion that just because of a
biological connection the adult is the parent. Most often the two factors do
coincide-preferably they will coincide-but from the child's point of
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view, who is the parent may have to be determined on another basis. Who
will be protected by the constitutional right that you are talking about? The
right should be a mutual right. It is the parent's right to raise her child as
she sees fit, within very broad parameters-and it is the child's right to
have a parent who can raise her without interference by the state into how
she is being raised.
THE REVIEW: Doesn't your theory's emphasis on the importance of ties
to a primary caretaker ignore a variety of family styles and different ethnic,
cultural, and economic backgrounds?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: First of all, it is a misperception that we are
talking about a single person. The justifications for intervention in Before
the Best Interests of the Child make quite clear the preference for a child
being brought up in the care of a family, whether it is extended or limited to
two parents or one. Minimally, however, the state has to identify one person
who has been or will be responsible for the care of the child in the way that
person thinks best. The child may well be brought up in an extended family,
with aunts, uncles, friends, or neighbors, or, to bring the more well-to-do,
though by no means better, parents or families into view, with nannies or
the headmasters or headmistresses of boarding schools. As long as that
person who is perceived as responsible in law does not cormmnit acts of
neglect or abuse, there should be no intervention.
We start out with enormous restraints on the right of the state to
intervene in various and diverse family styles. We are very respectful of
what families of different ethnic groups, origins, or economic status believe
is best for their children. Our guidelines are much more protective of a
variety of family lifestyles than are many existing laws, which are too broad
and vague and put all too much discretion in the hands of workers with
middle-class notions about good child-rearing.
THE REVIEW: It has been pointed out that children in some cultures
grow up being shared by different members of a kinship group, moving
from household to household without necessarily becoming attached to one
primary psychological parent or family. Do your guidelines take this into
account?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: If you look carefully at the way continuity is
defined in the book, you will see that it acknowledges just the kind of
situation you are describing. The notion of continuity pertains to continuity
of relationships, continuity of settings, continuity of lifestyles. Consider a
child who has grown up in a commune of some sort, and has had to leave
the commune at an age where that style of life is what she anticipates and
thrives on. If the setting was not the cause for the child's being removed,
then every effort should be made to place her in a similar setting to reduce
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the difficulty of the transfer in terms of as many factors as possible. The
critical thing is that the notion of continuity is not attached to any dogma
about child-rearing. It provides protection of continuity, the continuity of
the kind of child-rearing from which the child came. The least intrusive, the
least invasive, intervention is usually the least detrimental alternative.
THE REVIEW: Doesn't continuity of custodial setting presuppose
some financial stability and some ability to continue within a certain
neighborhood, dwelling, lifestyle? In other words, isn't continuity itself
something of a middle-class ideal?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: No. There is an order of importance in
continuity. We talk about interpersonal relationships with an adult. That is
number one and it has nothing to do with money. Then we talk about
continuity of surroundings. Now the surroundings may be poor or rich, but
we try to protect them to the extent we can. One of the things that emerges
from our guidelines is that it ought to be the state's first priority, if it really
believes in the child's well-being, to provide the minimum financial basis
the family needs, the minimum nourishment base, the minimum shelter
base, whatever best serves the development of continuous relationships. In
fact, if the only reason that a mother or father can't continue to care for the
child is because they have no place to live, or no money to buy food, then
we would call it child abuse by the state if the state for that reason removed
the child from her family.
THE REVIEW: But isn't this just what happens, and then poor families
lose their children?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: But that isn't what happens because of the
guidelines. Indeed, one of the reasons the books were written was to begin
to call a halt to that kind of activity, to force people who are working in
these areas to think about what they are doing. For example, money has
played a very substantial role in the development of notions about
visitation. In the eyes of many courts, the obligation of a noncustodial
parent to provide the child with care and funds determined whether visits
will be allowed. This is a total failure by the courts to recognize that we
have frowned as a society on using money as a basis for obtaining affection.
But let's assume that the state has wrongfully taken away a child
because the parents lacked sufficient money to look after her. We agree that
that shouldn't happen, but what if it does happen and a number of years
have elapsed so that under the guidelines the child's primary, paramount
ties have developed with the new parents, and those parents want to keep
the child? What then?
This is where the difficulty comes in. If you are thinking of the well-
being of the child, then you should not return the child to the natural
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parents. It may be that the parents have a right of action against the state for
money damages, for they have certainly been wronged, and the child was
wronged by being removed. But you do not rectify one or two wrongs that
have occurred once by inflicting yet another wrong on the child. Child
development knowledge tells us that the more often you remove a child
from a setting in which it has developed primary ties, the more damage you
do. If society prefers to use the child as the mode of compensation, fair
enough, but then society must acknowledge that what it is doing is not for
the child.
THE REVIEW: The observation has been made that your
recommendations generally appear to be followed in termination of parental
rights cases, which almost exclusively affect poor and minority families,
but that they rarely seem to be adhered to in divorce and custody cases
among the middle and upper classes. One reason given for this is that
judges identify with upper-middle-class fathers who want to remain a part
of the life of their child, whereas they don't identify with lower-class
families who don't want to lose contact with the child. Assuming this is the
reality, even though it is not the intent of your theories, how can you justify
what has been called an experiment being conducted solely on the poor and
minorities in this country?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTE1N: It is not just child placement where the poor
are disadvantaged, nor is it the result of anything we have said in our books.
The experiment on poor families was being carried out long before our
guidelines. If anything, the guidelines are intended to hold in check the
experiment, the experiment of the social worker who goes in and sees dirty
laundry and dirty dishes and uses that as a justification for intervening. That
is the kind of intervention we are trying to stop. We are trying to stay the
hand of the state. We hope we have provided a basis for the poor to
challenge what social workers do, what childcare workers do, and to call
into question what has been happening.
Now what you are saying is that in divorce cases the courts are ignoring
our guidelines with regard to joint custody and visitation perhaps because
many of those decisions are made by men and so often it is the father who
is denied visitation. It is just that kind of consideration we want to make
judges conscious of. We want to prevent them from intruding their own
personal beliefs or wishes into their decisions. We are trying to give them
guidelines and principles that are not related to class or poverty or ethnic
origin. Furthermore, with regard to joint custody, it is not just judges who
are responsible, but legislative bodies enacting legislation that is the fad of
the moment.
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THE REVIEW: When parties are in conflict over visitation, can't the law
be helpful in structuring their behavior and expectations?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: Under the standards we propose, it is not
divorce by itself, but only the failure of parents to be able to come to terms
about arrangements for custody that justifies intervention. When two
parents say, We turn to you, Your Honor, you tell us what arrangement is
satisfactory, at that point we say something has changed. If the custody
order is going to be an order that coerces, it will undermine the little bit of
strength that the child can have from the placement, an assurance that
whoever is selected as the primary caregiver can be responsible for making
decisions about the child.
You cannot force meaningful visits. We are not saying that the court
should be in a position to order that visits not take place, but we are saying
that whoever is to be the parent ought to be recognized as responsible
enough to decide about visits. It may be that a year after custody is
awarded, the parent who is primary custodian wants more than anything for
the other parent to show an interest in the child and works out an
arrangement for visitation. But the law ought not to press it on the child
against the primary custodian.
I am always surprised at how little emphasis there is by those who wish
to make new laws or reform existing laws on the pathetic sight of a child
who is gotten ready by the custodial parent at the direction of the court and
is waiting at the door for a parent who never shows up. That happens over
and over again, and the custodial parent then has to cope with this
disappointment, and each time it happens the child is worse off than before.
It makes an already difficult situation worse, and that is something that is
rarely focused on.
If the person who has visitation rights does not visit, the law never says
you must visit. That parent isn't held in contempt for not visiting, because
we recognize that we cannot force adults to do this. But What the courts are
doing is forcing the person who has to deal with the child on a day-to-day
basis to succumb to what the court says. In a sense this gives a veto power
to the person who really isn't responsible for the child on a day-to-day
basis.
THE REVIEW: Some would say that if the child has a parent who is
irresponsible, who doesn't show up for every visit, that she has to learn to
cope with that, because it is better for her to know this parent exists than to
feel that the parent is banished forever.
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: That is a very legitimate personal position,
and the question then becomes, is it appropriate to impose that notion about
child-rearing on all people through the coercive force of the state? That is
just the kind of judgment each person who is a parent has to make for
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himself or herself. It is beyond my comprehension how people can be so
arrogant as to think they know enough about what is right for every child
that their view should become the law, rather than trying, as we do, to find
guidelines that leave people with different notions about child-rearing free
to care for their children in a way they think best. So yes, we are for joint
custody and for maintaining contact with parents in termination cases if
everybody wants to cooperate. If everybody wants to cooperate, then the
law shouldn't be in there at all.
THE REVIEW: How do you respond to critics who take issue with the
psychoanalytic foundation of your theory, who disagree with you about the
impact of separation, the child's sense of time, and so forth?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: We certainly do not mean to say anything that
is an untruth. We think that our ideas are more than just beliefs, that they
rest on a disciplined and organized investigation of human experience and
on a substantial clinical base. Now to say that is not to tell the whole story
because what we have learned through a variety of disciplines, not just
psychoanalysis, only confirms what we know from ordinary common
knowledge and common sense.
Indeed, the whole notion in common law of protecting the privacy of
families comes out of a recognition of the need of families to have privacy,
to have a setting in which children can grow up and learn and be nourished
and be stimulated and be protected. It isn't as if our theory comes from
nowhere or from some new discovery; it is a confirmation of human
experience. Therefore, we say the burden of proof should be on those who
say it is either good or not harmful to take children from their family setting
or to break the ties they may have to the adults who have assumed
responsibility for them.
THE REVIEW: Assuming you do not now agree with these critics, what
if one day you were presented with evidence that it was more harmful for a
child never to know her natural parents than to be separated for an extended
period of time and returned-would you alter your views?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: If there were such evidence, certainly it would
have an impact on our guidelines; it would mean that the law ought not to
be concerned with safeguarding the continuity between a child and an adult
once it intervenes in a family. There is nothing best once you begin to break
up the natural family, but such evidence would change our assessment of
the least detrimental alternative. Of course, critical to reliance on such
findings would be some understanding of how the researchers define the
'know" in "know her natural parents."
Let us consider an actual case. There is a child who has been in foster
care from the age of three weeks to the age of nine years and all of a sudden
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the natural father, who had never previously identified himself, appears and
says, I want my child. Let's assume that experts could show that some
children will be hurt more by being left with the foster parent who may
(although not necessarily) deny access to or information about the natural
parent, than by being returned to the natural parent. If that were true, then
sure, the least detrimental alternative would be to turn that nine-year-old
child over to a person who, from the child's point of view, is a stranger.
Okay, if it is true that this stranger is more important than the family the
child has been living with for ten years, then the child should be returned to
its biological parent. Such a finding would be so in conflict with ordinary
knowledge, with common experience, that I would be skeptical about its
validity. But I could be convinced.
No single factor can be the basis for a judgment about what is least
detrimental. That is why we would prefer not to allow this kind of dogma to
intrude on a placement; it is too detailed a factor. The goal of every
placement should be to place every child in a setting in which someone is
responsible for making judgments, even the judgment about the desirability
of knowing who your father or mother was or whether I am really your
mother or I am really your father. There are lots of children who are the
result of a relationship in which no one may know who the father is.
The point is, notions about what information children should have and
when is one of the functions parents perform. There is no one answer, there
is no one right way of bringing up children, but there may be a right way
for each parent. In one sense, our guidelines are aimed at preventing some
massive error arising from the state adopting a doctrine that every child
ought to be moved because somebody has come up with a study that it is
harmful for children to be deprived of contact with their natural parents.
That may be true in some cases, it may not be true in others. Statistics and
empirical studies have the burden of overcoming common sense and
ordinary knowledge.
THE REVIEW: Do you think your guidelines have sometimes been
misused because childcare workers or judges may have misunderstood
them?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: It is quite likely that there is confusion about
the application of some of the theoretical principles amongst those who
actually have cases to resolve. In part I think this is true because too much
power generally is attributed to rules, regulations, and guidelines; no
guideline can be expected to have the intended impact unless those who
make decisions share and understand the philosophy which underlies it.
One of the basic functions of both books was to provide a commentary for
the guidelines. It is critical that when people who administer child
placement are trained, they learn what the basis is for any guideline. A
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guideline is a precondition for restraining authority as well as a premise for
granting it. At the same time, however, it is only one of the necessary
conditions. Without the training and continuous exchanges that enables
each worker in the system to understand the purposes of the guidelines,
whether they are our guidelines or someone else's, they may be misused.
There was a case involving a new state childcare worker who made a
misguided effort to apply what she understood to be the policy of the
department that each child should have a permanent placement. In poring
over the files assigned to her, she discovered a child who had been in foster
care with the same family for five years. She never inquired why the foster
family had not sought adoption. There was, in fact, a good reason: Because
one of the foster parents had been ill, they had reluctantly decided it might
be inappropriate at the time to seek adoption. There was no conflict with the
natural parents; it had already been decided that termination of the natural
parents' rights was feasible and desirable. Without consulting her
supervisor or talking with the foster parents, she visited the child in school
and assured her that the department intended her to have a permanent home.
She told the girl that she would look for an adopting family. It was a terrible
experience for the child, who thought that she was going to have to leave
the two people she thought of as her real parents.
There is no question that this child's need for continuity of care and
permanency was safeguarded by leaving her in foster care without
adoption, but by mechanically applying the notion of permanency, equating
it with adoption, the social worker acted inappropriately and without regard
to the theoretical underpinnings of the guidelines. Fortunately, a supervisor
discovered what was happening and prevented the social worker from doing
further harm.
That is an example of a well-intentioned worker misreading the
guideline that says each child in the care of the state should be provided
with a permanent home if possible. Aside from such misunderstandings, in
general a good deal has to be done over time to train workers to hold in
check their personal dogma about what good child-rearing is and to restrict
intervention to a very narrow range of justifications for intrusion. Whenever
possible, and I think this is more and more the case, the state must offer
support services to the family rather than separate the child from her
parents.
As far as courts are concerned, I am not sure they misinterpret so much
as reject some of the guidelines. In trying to safeguard the family of the
child, very often they confuse the real family and the legal family. Too
often, whoever is designated the legal parent is perceived to be the child's
family. By contrast, we try to look at the family from the vantage point of
the child; that is, we try to put ourselves in the skin of children of different
ages, recognizing that most children don't know what the law is but do
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know from interpersonal relationships who their family is. Of course, who
the child's real family is never arises until the child becomes the subject of
state intervention. Again, it is worth emphasizing that the justifications for
intervention under our guidelines are far narrower than those currently
applied in most states.
THE REVIEW: What have you learned from the responses you've gotten
to the translations of the two books?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: One of the things we learned or relearned is
no matter how much precision you give to guidelines, it is critical that the
person administering the law comprehend and understand what led to those
guidelines. Vagueness and distortion are not necessarily the culprits. In
Germany, for example, my impression is that the narrow and restrictive
statutory language of child-placement codes may be used in broad and
intrusive ways. On the other hand, my impression is that in France, there is
less intervention than might be expected from the broad statutory language
in which the codes appear to be written.
We have also learned about the very strong wish of the parent who is
not the custodian (this is primarily in divorce cases) to have a right of
access to her child. Parents are universally troubled by the notion that we
would not recommend forcing the custodial parent to make access
available. But at the same time we have come to learn how frequently those
who are vehement about having access soon tire of the opportunity and give
up taking advantage of it at the very moment when the custodial parent is
very anxious for the visit to take place. I don't say this as a universally
general proposition, but there are a number of examples.
THE REVIEW: From your point of view, what is the value of a
symposium like this?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: Aside from the fact that we learn a great deal
from these discussions, the most important thing is that what was not
discussed for a long time is being discussed now. Decisions were made and
taken for granted as appropriate and best for children without thought and
without conscious deliberation. Discussions provide a chance for the cakes
of custom to be shaken so that we can rethink what we are doing. That,
after all, is all we can ask for-that we take sufficient time away from the
demands of every day to think about what we often do without thought
because we need a Band-Aid here or a Band-Aid there.
When someone said, aren't you sorry that you wrote this book because
it can be misused, my answer was that had I thought to invent the paring
knife as a neat tool for peeling fruit, I wouldn't have been inhibited from
doing it even though I was aware that some people might misuse the paring
knife by putting it in someone else's back. The fact that these ideas can be
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misused is true of anything, but that oughtn't to prevent someone from
sharing thoughts which are free of the pressure of day-to-day decisions with
others who have to make decisions under pressure. Finally, I think we as
professionals can learn from discussion that simple solutions, simple
guidelines, are not necessarily simplistic. Indeed such guidelines, in
recognizing the fragility and complexity of human relationships, provide
more sophisticated solutions than guidelines that empower the state to
detail, and on a continuing basis, to review and to manage such
relationships.
THE REVIEW: In an effort to elucidate the interrelations between your
ideas and your own background, could you tell us something about the class
and family you come from?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: If I were being interviewed by People
magazine, I would have anticipated a question like that and might have-
albeit reluctantly-contributed to their insatiable interest in gossip. To
answer your question would only feed into the kinds of stereotypes that the
media are prone to promote for their readers who want to engage in some
form of curbstone psychoanalysis. The test of what we write in our books
ought to be how adequately we have expressed our ideas and how well-
founded they are.
THE REVIEW: So the criticism that white upper-middle-class notions
about families and children underlie the ideas in your books ought not to be
addressed by looking at your background?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: That is correct. What ought to be addressed is
whether, in fact, our guidelines are valid and if valid, whether they apply
only to white middle-class families. Indeed, if our guidelines have any
purpose, if they say anything, it is that we must beware of professional
participants in the child-placement process who are insufficiently trained to
be able to separate their personal from their professional views. Our
guidelines say to the lawyers, the judges, the social workers, and the experts
in child development, Be conscious of the force of your background on the
decisions you are empowered to make on behalf of children. Indeed,
because the coercive authority of the state has been given to you in your
job, we have sought-through our guidelines-to remove from you the
broad discretion that has been granted to you by such vague and undefined
statutory phrases as "neglect," "abuse," and "emotional harm." The
guidelines are designed to prevent those with such power from imposing
upon the children and families they serve their middle-class, lower-class, or
upper-class notions of what is "good" or "bad." We have tried to fashion
principles that prefer children and that can be applied neutrally once the
state is empowered to intervene.
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THE REVIEW: Could you tell us something about the new book you are
working on?
PROFESSOR GOLDSTEIN: With Sonja Goldstein, the authors of Before
and Beyond have been working on a third book in the series to be called In
the Best Interests of the Child. In that book we address questions about the
role of each professional participant-that is, the nonparent participant in
the child-placement process. The purpose of the book is to help each of
these professionals, whether they come from law or social work or child
development or psychoanalysis, to recognize and be sensitive to the
boundaries of their knowledge and be aware of the great temptation and
pressure on them to move outside the limits of their knowledge. We are
concerned with and try to identify situations where the professional
testifying in court, for example, should say, "I don't know," rather than
give some answer just because she feels uncomfortable that under cross-
examination she might appear less than professional. More than that, the
book is an effort to help each person recognize when she as a parent or as
someone who has been a child, is letting creep into her observations or
judgment that which comes from another experience, not from her
expertise. We also discuss the temptation to do the work of someone else
who is a participant in the process, as for example, when judges act as
psychologists or analysts of the parties and make judgments as silent
witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination by the parties. There are
a whole variety of situations in which we try to sort out when professionals
may cross boundaries consciously, when they may not, and when they are
called upon to do something they are qualified to do but in a setting where
they are asked to play more than one role. That is, they may be able to
perform either role in terms of their training but cannot perform both roles
in relation to the same family or the same child without undercutting what it
is they have been engaged to do because of their expertise.
Finally, we stress that it is in the best interests of the child that the
professional participants in the child-placement process always keep in
mind that they are not the child's parents. Even though each of them may
temporarily assume one or more aspects of the parental task, neither alone
nor together can they replace parents. To be a parent is to be a generalist,
not an expert.
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